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“SOMEBODY HELP ME UNDERSTAND
THIS”: THE SUPREME COURT’S
INTERPRETATION OF PROSECUTORIAL
IMMUNITY AND LIABILITY UNDER § 1983
Kate McClelland *
INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 2011, the Supreme Court of the United States held in
Connick v. Thompson 1 that a district attorney’s office could not be held
liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a single Brady 2 violation by one of its
prosecutors. The 5–4 decision split along ideological lines. The
conservative branch of the Court refused to hold a district attorney’s office
liable for what it saw as a single Brady violation by a lone, rogue
prosecutor. The liberal wing of the Court interpreted the facts differently,
and found egregious Brady violations that deprived the respondent of his
constitutional rights. The case appalled commentators. 3 In their opinion,
the respondent clearly suffered an injustice at the hands of his prosecutors,
and yet the Court’s opinion barely acknowledged his suffering and instead
justified the decision on questionable (if not downright flimsy) grounds.
One commentator went so far as to call the opinion one of the “meanest”
Supreme Court decisions ever written.4 The case will have far-reaching
*

J.D. Candidate, Northwestern University School of Law, 2013; B.A., University of
Notre Dame, 2009.
1
131 S. Ct. 1350, 1356 (2011).
2
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that it is a violation of due process
to withhold from the defense evidence that would tend to exculpate the defendant).
3
See, e.g., Editorial, Failure of Empathy and Justice, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 1, 2011, at A26;
Bennett L. Gershman & Joel Cohen, Cops Are Stupid, But Prosecutors Are Smart,
HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bennett-l-gershman/copsare-stupid-but-prose_b_843583.html; Wendy Kaminer, When the Supreme Court Fears Too
Much Justice, ATLANTIC (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/
03/when-the-supreme-court-fears-too-much-justice/73252/; Scott Lemieux, The Impunity of
the Roberts Court, AMERICAN PROSPECT (Apr. 1, 2011), http://prospect.org/article/impunityroberts-court.
4
Dahlia Lithwick, Cruel but Not Unusual: Clarence Thomas Writes One of the Meanest
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implications for prosecutorial accountability under Brady and the ability of
criminal defendants to assert civil rights claims against prosecutors’ offices
under § 1983.
Prior to the Supreme Court decision, respondent John Thompson, in
discussing his conviction, said, “They call it malfeasance of office and get a
slap on the wrist while I’m up at Angola [the Louisiana State Penitentiary]
on death row for 18 years. Somebody help me understand this.”5 But
practitioners and judges hardly have any clearer idea of when prosecutors
can be punished for their misconduct. The Court’s current approach to
prosecutorial liability under § 1983 is a mess. The decisions in this area of
law have made it more difficult for defendants to prove violations of their
constitutional rights while increasing the strength of prosecutors’ immunity
for their actions (both individually and collectively as an office). Even in
cases like Connick, where everyone agrees that a constitutional violation
occurred, no punishment results. Without enforcement, Brady and other
rules designed to protect a defendant’s rights are effectively negated.
Currently, a former defendant bringing a § 1983 claim against a
prosecutor’s office must show a pattern of constitutional violations within
the office that proves that: (1) the district attorney failed to properly train
his or her subordinates and (2) that failure to train directly caused the
violations.6 But the Court has never clearly defined what series of events in
a prosecutor’s office actually constitutes a “pattern.” In lieu of a pattern,
some case law suggests that municipal liability for failure to train can result
from a “single incident,” 7 if the need to train was “so obvious” 8 that the
municipal policymakers responsible for training were deliberately
indifferent in not training their subordinates. 9 However, Connick appears to
reject the single-incident-liability approach, at least in the case of
prosecutors’ offices. 10
Part I of this Comment will examine the Connick decision. This Part
will walk through the facts of John Thompson’s original case, the
procedural history of Connick itself, the majority’s reasoning in Connick,
and the minority’s counterpoints. Part II will examine the Supreme Court’s
Supreme Court Decisions Ever, SLATE (Apr. 1, 2011, 7:43 PM), http://www.slate.com/
articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/04/cruel_but_not_unusual.html.
5
Richard A. Webster, Life Sentence: Justice Elusive for the Wrongfully Convicted
Victims, NEW ORLEANS CITY BUS. (Jun. 4, 2007), http://www.r-a-e.org/press/life-sentencejustice-elusive-wrongfully-convicted-victims.
6
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358; Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520
U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997).
7
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989).
8
Id.
9
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361; Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10.
10
See infra notes 189–191 and accompanying text.
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case law on prosecutorial immunity and municipal liability—precedent that
ultimately shaped the Connick decision. Part III will discuss the problems
with the rule established by Connick and the other cases. Part IV will
assess alternatives to requiring the Supreme Court to overhaul its precedent
in this area, including stricter ethical sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct
and internal structural reform of prosecutors’ offices. Finally, Part V will
argue that the Supreme Court should overrule its precedent and adopt
absolute immunity for prosecutors to put an end to the current confusion in
the law.
I. CONNICK V. THOMPSON
John Thompson spent eighteen years in prison—fourteen of them on
death row—for a crime that he did not commit. 11 He was charged with the
murder of the son of a prominent New Orleans businessman in 1985. 12
John Thompson’s face covered the New Orleans press. 13 A local father
whose three minor children had been victims of a recent attempted armed
robbery showed them a newspaper and asked if Thompson was the man
who had robbed them. 14 They identified him as their attacker. 15
Four prosecutors from the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office
handled Thompson’s two cases. 16 Assistant District Attorneys James
Williams and Gerry Deegan were assigned to the armed robbery, while
Williams and Eric Dubelier were assigned to the murder. 17 Assistant
District Attorney Bruce Whittaker approved the armed robbery
indictment. 18 Although Dubelier and Williams were two of the highest
ranking attorneys in the office at the time, none of the prosecutors had even
five years of experience as a prosecutor.19 Together the prosecutors made
the strategic decision to proceed with the armed robbery trial first.20 If
Thompson were convicted of armed robbery prior to the murder trial, he
would be vulnerable to impeachment if he took the stand in his defense at

11

Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1355.
Id. at 1371 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
14
Id. at 1372 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id.
19
Id. at 1379. Williams had been with the office for four-and-a-half years, Dubelier for
three-and-a-half years, Whittaker for three years, and Deegan for less than one year. Id. at
1372 n.3.
20
Id. at 1372.
12
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the murder trial. 21
The armed robber left blood behind on the pant leg of one of his
victims. 22 A crime lab technician took a swatch of the bloodied fabric from
the pants and sent it to the crime lab one week before Thompson’s armed
robbery trial. 23 Whittaker received the report from the crime lab, and
placed it on Williams’s desk, but Williams denied ever seeing it in his later
testimony at trial. 24 Meanwhile, Deegan checked out all of the physical
evidence in the case from the police property room on the first day of trial,
including the bloody swatch. 25 But when he checked all of the evidence
into the courthouse property room, the swatch was missing. 26 Thompson’s
defense counsel never learned of its existence, and Thompson was
convicted of the armed robbery. 27 Because of this conviction, he did not
testify at his later murder trial, and later in 1985 he was also convicted of
first-degree murder. 28
In 1994, Deegan was dying. 29 He confessed to his friend and fellow
prosecutor Michael Riehlmann that he had hidden exculpatory blood
evidence during Thompson’s armed robbery trial. 30 Riehlmann did not tell
anyone about this conversation for five years.31
In 1999, Thompson’s private investigator—in a last-ditch effort to
save his client from being executed—reexamined all of the prosecution’s
files on Thompson’s cases. 32 He uncovered the crime lab report on the
blood evidence from the armed robbery. 33 The robber’s blood was Type
B. 34 Thompson is Type O. 35 When the new information came forward, a
judge vacated the armed robbery conviction and in 2003, when he was
retried for murder, Thompson was found not guilty. 36
After his release from prison in 2003, John Thompson filed suit
against the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office, District Attorney
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36

Id.
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1373 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
Id. at 1374 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
Id.
Id. at 1375.
Id. at 1356 (majority opinion).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1357.
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Harry Connick Sr., James Williams, and others under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. 37
Thompson alleged that the defendants violated his constitutional rights
under Brady 38 by withholding the crime lab report. 39 Thompson put
forward two theories. 40 First, he claimed that the district attorney’s office
had an unconstitutional Brady policy. 41 In the alternative, he alleged that
regardless of what Orleans Parish’s official Brady policy was, the violation
resulted from Connick’s deliberate indifference to the need to train his
subordinates in proper Brady procedure. 42 In district court, the jury rejected
the first claim, but agreed with Thompson that Connick was deliberately
indifferent to the need to train. 43 They awarded Thompson $14 million in
damages 44—$1 million for each year that he was on death row.45
The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting en banc, divided
evenly on the failure-to-train issue, thus upholding the district court
judgment. 46 The Supreme Court then granted certiorari “to decide whether
a district attorney’s office may be held liable under § 1983 for failure to
train based on a single Brady violation.” 47 In a 5–4 decision, the Court held
that an office could not be held liable based on a single Brady violation. 48
Justice Thomas wrote the Court’s opinion. 49 He reasoned that
Thompson’s claim could not succeed because he did not prove a pattern of
violations that would indicate a failure to train prosecutors. 50 Moreover,
Thompson did not prove that the single violation in his case was sufficient
to give rise to liability. 51
Consistent with precedent, the opinion stated that “[a] pattern of
similar constitutional violations by untrained employees is ‘ordinarily
necessary’ to demonstrate deliberate indifference for purposes of failure to
37

Id.
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding that it is a violation of due process
to withhold from the defense evidence that would tend to exculpate the defendant).
39
Id.
40
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1357.
41
Id.
42
Id.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
James Ridgeway & Jean Casella, 14 Years on Death Row. $14 Million in Damages?,
MOTHER JONES (October 6, 2010, 3:00 AM), http://www.motherjones.com/politics/2010/09/
connick-v-thompson.
46
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1358.
47
Id. at 1356.
48
Id. at 1355.
49
Id.
50
Id. at 1360.
51
Id. at 1361.
38
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train.” 52 Thomas stated that Thompson did not try to prove a pattern.53 Yet
Thompson did reference four convictions from Orleans Parish that were
overturned by Louisiana courts in the ten years prior to his armed robbery
trial due to the failure to disclose exculpatory evidence.54 Those cases,
however, were not “similar to the violation at issue” in Thompson’s case
because the disputed evidence was not scientific, like Thompson’s blood
evidence was. 55
The single Brady violation at issue in the case was also not enough on
its own to establish liability. 56 In Canton v. Harris, the Court hypothesized
a situation in which specific legal training was so clearly needed that the
failure to give employees that training would necessarily lead to
constitutional violations.57 Here, Thomas reasoned, the assistant district
attorneys already had the legal training that they needed. 58 They had all
received a law license, graduated from law school, and passed the bar
examination.59 Continuing education classes were readily available, 60 and
they had the opportunity to learn on the job from their superiors, 61 who
would circulate information about important cases and legal
52
Id. at 1360 (citing Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 409
(1997)).
53
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
54
Id. The Supreme Court was well aware of the Brady violations occurring in the
Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. The suppression of exculpatory statements by a
codefendant in violation of Brady, which took place in a 1984 Orleans Parish case, also
made it to the Supreme Court on appeal in 1995. See Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995).
55
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1360.
56
Id. at 1361.
57
Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989)). Harris envisions
a scenario where police are given deadly weapons to use in the field, but are not trained in
the constitutional use of deadly force. In that case, a single incident of deadly force by an
officer would be sufficient to hold the municipality liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a
violation of constitutional rights. See Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10; see also infra Part II.B.
58
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1361.
59
Id. But cf. id. at 1385 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (citing multiple facts from the trial
record and the Justice’s own research that would undermine this confidence in the presence
of Brady in law schools and the Louisiana Bar Examination).
60
Id. at 1362 (majority opinion). But cf. id. at 1381 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(“Louisiana did not require continuing legal education at the time of Thompson’s trials.”
(citations omitted)).
61
Id. at 1362 (majority opinion). But cf. id. at 1380 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Dubelier
and Williams, as senior prosecutors in the Office, were free to take cases to trial without
[attending a pretrial conference with the Office’s chief of trials], and that is just how they
proceeded in Thompson’s prosecutions.” (citations omitted)); see also id. at 1379–80
(Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“By 1985, Dubelier and Williams were two of the highest ranking
attorneys in the Office, yet neither man had even five years of experience as a prosecutor . . .
[they] told the jury that they did not recall any Brady training in the Office.” (citations
omitted)).
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developments. 62 Moreover, the attorneys were held to strict character and
fitness standards and the ethical standards imposed by the legal
community. 63 Simply put, “[a]ttorneys are trained in the law and equipped
with the tools to interpret and apply legal principles, understand
constitutional limits and exercise legal judgment.” 64 Given these factors,
Connick had no reason to believe that his assistants needed any further
training. 65
Additionally, Thomas pointed out, all of the assistant district attorneys
working on Thompson’s case knew about the general rule of Brady v.
Maryland. 66 Thompson’s arguments appeared to suggest that formal
training was needed, 67 but a lack of formal training was not the equivalent
of the complete lack of legal training hypothesized in Harris. 68 While
additional training might have been helpful for the prosecutors, the Court
held that a lack of such training was not enough to impose liability. 69
II. THE PRECEDENT THAT SHAPED CONNICK
Connick’s reasoning is so convoluted because it combines two prior
lines of Supreme Court case law. The first line of cases present in Connick
deals with prosecutorial immunity. 70 Those cases establish a functional test
to determine whether prosecutors have absolute or qualified immunity for
their actions. Prosecutors have absolute immunity for many of their
actions, but when they have only qualified immunity, they may be liable
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. According to this statute:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
62
Id. at 1362 (majority opinion). But cf. id. at 1381 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“The
[1987 Office policy] manual contained four sentences, nothing more, on Brady. This slim
instruction, the jury learned, was notably inaccurate, incomplete, and dated.” (footnote
omitted) (citations omitted)).
63
Id. at 1362 (majority opinion). But cf. id. at 1382 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(“[Connick] never disciplined or fired a single prosecutor for violating Brady.” (citation
omitted)).
64
Id. at 1361 (majority opinion).
65
Id. at 1363.
66
Id. But cf. id. at 1378 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting) (“Connick was the Office’s sole
policymaker, and his testimony exposed a flawed understanding of a prosecutor’s Brady
obligations.”).
67
Id. at 1363 (majority opinion). But cf. id. at 1378 (Ginsberg, J., dissenting)
(“Thompson, it bears emphasis, is not complaining about the absence of formal training
sessions. His complaint does not demand that Brady compliance be enforced in any
particular way. He asks only that Brady obligations be communicated accurately and
genuinely enforced.” (footnote omitted) (citations omitted)).
68
Id. at 1363 (majority opinion).
69
Id.
70
See infra Part II.A.
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of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and the laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit
71
in equity or other proper proceeding for redress . . . .

If a prosecutor with qualified immunity violates a defendant’s
constitutional rights (and thereby § 1983), the defendant may sue the
municipality that employs the prosecutor for monetary damages to
recompense the violation. 72
The second line of cases implicated in Connick deals with this
municipal liability under § 1983.73 Municipalities cannot be held liable
under § 1983 under a respondeat superior theory. 74 For § 1983 to apply,
the municipality’s official policy must be the direct cause of the
constitutional violation. 75 A policy failing to properly train employees and
directly causing a recurring pattern of constitutional violations demonstrates
deliberate indifference on the part of the municipality and results in § 1983
liability. 76 The plaintiff must show (1) that municipal policymakers chose a
policy that failed to train the municipality’s employees adequately, (2) the
policy amounted to deliberate indifference to citizens’ constitutional rights,
and (3) the policy directly caused (4) a pattern of violations of
constitutional rights. Alternatively, at least prior to Connick, a plaintiff
could also show that a single action by a municipal employee was so
egregious that it was obvious that the municipality was deliberately
indifferent to the need to train that employee. 77
A. THE PROSECUTORIAL IMMUNITY CASES
The Supreme Court decided its first case on prosecutorial immunity,
Imbler v. Pachtman, in 1976. 78 In Imbler, the Court established the
71

42 U.S.C § 1983 (2006).
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976). It is far more common to see § 1983
actions brought against police officers, particularly for the use of excessive force in
contravention of an arrestee’s constitutional rights. See, e.g., Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S.
386 (1989).
73
See infra Part II.B.
74
See Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978). In other words, one
municipal employee’s violation of a citizen’s constitutional rights does not automatically
confer damages liability on the municipality. See id.
75
See id. at 694.
76
See City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 397 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring); see
also Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997).
77
See Harris, 489 U.S. at 390 n.10 (1989).
78
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 409. Paul Imbler was found guilty of first-degree murder and
sentenced to death. Id. at 412. After the resolution of the case, Richard Pachtman, the
prosecutor on the case, wrote to the Governor of California stating that he had uncovered
72
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functional test to determine whether absolute or qualified immunity should
apply to a prosecutor. 79 Section 1983 did not eliminate immunities “well
grounded in history and reason” 80—including absolute immunity for
prosecutors. 81 The Court cited various public policy reasons why
prosecutors had been given absolute immunity at common law, which were
still important. 82 Prosecutors were quasi-judicial officers who, like judges,
required protection for actions that were “intimately associated with the
judicial phase of the criminal process.”83 Moreover, the possibility of
professional discipline for ethical violations served as a check on their
However, the Court stated explicitly that it was not
behavior. 84
“consider[ing] whether like or similar reasons require immunity for those
aspects of the prosecutor’s responsibility that cast him in the role of
administrator or investigative officer rather than that of advocate.” 85
Determining whether a prosecutor was protected by absolute immunity thus
depended on the nature of the role he was engaged in when the alleged
violation took place. If the prosecutor was acting as an advocate—
“initiating a prosecution and presenting the State’s case”—he received
absolute immunity. 86 The Court reserved the question of what type of
immunity applied when the prosecutor was functioning as an investigator or
an administrator.87
Burns v. Reed partially addressed this question by holding that
prosecutors acting in an investigatory capacity were only entitled to
qualified immunity. 88 The Supreme Court held that a prosecutor has
new evidence that corroborated Imbler’s alibi defense. Id. A key eyewitness also recanted
his prior identification testimony. Id. at 413. After years of litigation on these issues, the
Ninth Circuit granted Imbler’s habeas petition, and he filed a § 1983 action against
Pachtman and others. Id. at 415.
79
Id. at 430.
80
Id. at 418 (citations omitted).
81
Id. at 424.
82
Id. at 424–27.
83
Id. at 430.
84
Id. at 429.
85
Id. at 430–31.
86
Id. at 431.
87
Id. at 430–31.
88
500 U.S. 478 (1991). Petitioner Cathy Burns had called the police, claiming that an
unknown intruder entered her home and shot her two young sons. Id. at 481. The officers
assigned to the case treated Burns as the primary suspect. Id. Theorizing that she had
multiple personality disorder, they wanted to question her under hypnosis. Id. at 482. They
asked the Chief Deputy Prosecutor, Richard Reed, whether they could use hypnosis, and he
advised them that they could. Id. Reed used the results of the interview under hypnosis at a
probable cause hearing, and Burns was charged with the attempted murder of her sons. Id. at
482–83. A judge later granted her motion to suppress the evidence gained under hypnosis
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absolute immunity for her actions during a probable cause hearing because
she is acting in her role as “advocate for the State.”89 When a prosecutor
advises the police about what investigative techniques they are able to use
to obtain evidence, however, only qualified immunity protects her. 90 The
Court rejected the idea that under the common law this advice would have
been protected too. 91 Protected activity needed a sufficient link to the court
proceeding, because “the concern with litigation in our immunity cases is
not merely a generalized concern with interference with an official’s duties,
but rather is a concern with interference with the conduct closely related to
the judicial process.” 92 While the Court acknowledged that almost any
purely investigative activity could be linked to the decision to prosecute, the
protection of absolute immunity only extended to actions intimately
associated with the judicial process.93
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons further clarified the limits of advocacy as
opposed to investigation. 94 The Supreme Court found that the prosecutors
were acting in an investigative capacity when they had expert after expert
assess the evidence in the case until they found one whose testimony
aligned with their theory of the case.95 The Court appeared to establish a
new bright-line rule: “A prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself
to be, an advocate before he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.”96
The majority appeared to be saying that the advocacy function—and thus
and upon her release from custody, she filed a § 1983 action against Reed, the police, and
others. Id. at 483.
89
Id. at 491.
90
Id. at 496.
91
Id. at 493.
92
Id. at 494.
93
Id. at 495.
94
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 261 (1993). Stephen Buckley had been
imprisoned for three years for the highly publicized murder of a young girl that took place in
1983. Id. at 261. He claimed liability under § 1983 for fabricated evidence and false
statements made by Fitzsimmons, the DuPage County state’s attorney, at a press conference
about the case. Id. at 262. The girl’s killer had kicked in the door of her home, leaving
behind a bootprint. Id. The prosecutors tried to match the print to petitioner’s boots. Id.
Three respected and credible evidence labs found no match, but prosecutors located an
anthropologist of questionable credibility who would testify that the print was made by
Buckley’s boots. Id. A grand jury spent eight months investigating all of the evidence,
including the bootprint evidence, and was unable to return an indictment. Id. at 264.
Fitzsimmons was running for reelection in a close race in early 1984. Id. Before that
election, he brought an indictment against Buckley and held the press conference to
announce it. Id. Buckley was not freed until 1987, when the anthropologist and star witness
in his case died and could no longer testify at his retrial—even though his first trial had
ended in a mistrial and another man had confessed to the crime. Id.
95
Id. at 274.
96
Id.
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absolute immunity—does not take hold until after a finding of probable
cause. 97 As to the press conference that was held in conjunction with the
defendant’s indictment, the Court noted that at common law, prosecutors
had immunity for defamation that occurred as a part of judicial proceedings,
but not for out-of-court statements. 98 Moreover, the conduct of a press
conference is unrelated to a prosecutor’s duties as an advocate—“a
prosecutor is in no different position than other executive officials who deal
with the press, and . . . qualified immunity is the norm for them.” 99
In Kalina v. Fletcher, a unanimous Supreme Court ruled that a
prosecutor was entitled to only qualified immunity when she executed the
certification required by local court rule that required that she essentially act
as a complaining witness and swear to the facts alleged as the basis for
probable cause and the issuance of an arrest warrant. 100 The preparation
and filing of such a certification fell under the advocacy function,101 but the
prosecutor was performing the function of a complaining witness when she
made false statements of fact in the certification under penalty of perjury. 102
The Court emphasized that “[t]estifying about facts is the function of the
witness, not of the lawyer.” 103
In Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, the final case in this line prior to
Connick, a unanimous Supreme Court described for the first time what a
prosecutor’s “administrative” functions might look like. 104 The Court held
97

See id. at 286 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Id. at 277 (majority opinion).
99
Id. at 278.
100
522 U.S. 118, 129–31 (1997). In Kalina, Lynne Kalina, a deputy prosecuting
attorney for King County, Washington, filed three documents with the King County Superior
Court to bring charges against respondent Rodney Fletcher. Id. at 120–121. One document
was an information charging Fletcher with burglary, one was a motion for an arrest warrant,
and the third was called a “Certification for Determination of Probable Cause.” Id. at 121.
According to a local rule, an arrest warrant must be accompanied by an affidavit or “sworn
testimony establishing the grounds for issuing the warrant.” Id. (quoting WASH. SUP. CT.
CRIM. R. 2.2(a)). Typically, a complaining witness provides the affidavit, but here, Kalina
swore to the affidavit herself. Id. at 129–30. It contained two inaccurate factual statements.
Id. at 121. As a result of Kalina’s filing, Fletcher was arrested and spent a day in jail. Id. at
122. The prosecutor’s office later dropped charges against him. Id.
101
Id. at 129.
102
Id. at 131.
103
Id. at 130.
104
555 U.S. 335, 338–39 (2009). Thomas Goldstein was convicted of murder in 1980,
based largely on the testimony of a jailhouse informant. Id. at 339. In his federal habeas
petition, the District Court found that if prosecutors had informed the defense that the
informant was receiving a reward for his testimony, it might have made a difference in
Goldstein’s case. Id. The habeas petition was granted, and the Ninth Circuit Court of
Appeals affirmed. Id. Goldstein then filed a § 1983 action against former District Attorney
Van de Kamp and his chief deputy district attorney, alleging that prosecutors violated his
98
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that the training, supervision, and information system management at issue
were administrative functions—but they were nonetheless directly related to
the conduct of the trial, and therefore entitled to absolute immunity. 105 The
functions at issue “necessarily require[d] legal knowledge and the exercise
of related discretion.” 106 The Court cited Imbler’s public policy concerns,
Since
particularly the chilling effect that liability would have. 107
“[d]ecisions about indictment or trial prosecution will often involve more
than one prosecutor within an office,” 108 multiple prosecutors could be
liable under qualified immunity for the types of decisions at issue in Van de
Kamp. If many prosecutors were liable for these decisions, then they would
behave differently because the risk of § 1983 liability might lessen their
willingness to prosecute.109
The Supreme Court began in Imbler with a functional test that seemed
clear and simple to apply. With each subsequent case, the Court chipped
away at the advocatory, investigative, and administrative distinctions. After
Van de Kamp, the Court had determined that so many prosecutorial
functions were intimately associated with the conduct of the trial that the
functional test had lost its meaning.
B. THE MUNICIPAL LIABILITY CASES
The failure-to-train concept of Van de Kamp came from the line of
cases relating to municipal liability that was developing alongside the
prosecutorial immunity cases. The first case in this line is Monell v.
Department of Social Services of the City of New York. 110 In Monell, the
Court overruled an earlier case, Monroe v. Pape, which held that
municipalities were wholly immune from liability under § 1983. 111 Delving
constitutional rights when they refused to turn over the information on the informant in
violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972) (holding that the failure on the part
of a United States Attorney to disclose the fact that the prosecution witness had been offered
immunity for his testimony was a violation of due process), and that the violation occurred
as a result of a failure by Van de Kamp to properly train and supervise his assistants. Id. at
340. He also alleged that Van de Kamp’s office should have had an information system
about informants to prevent such an occurrence. Id.
105
Id. at 344.
106
Id.
107
Id. at 345.
108
Id.
109
Id. at 346–47.
110
436 U.S. 658 (1978). A group of female employees filed a § 1983 action against the
Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of the City of New York for
forcing them to take unnecessary, unpaid medical leave while they were pregnant. Id. at
660–61.
111
Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961).
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into the legislative history of § 1983, 112 the Court determined that
municipalities could face liability if “official municipal policy of some
nature caused a constitutional tort.” 113 However, municipalities could not
be held liable just because they employed someone who committed a
constitutional tort—that is, respondeat superior did not apply. 114 The
municipality’s policy or custom had to be the “moving force,” or direct
cause, of the violation. 115
In the next three cases in this line—Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, Pembaur
v. Cincinnati, and City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik—the Court was often
badly divided on reasoning. These three cases failed to clarify the holding
of Monell either by defining the terms “official policy” and “policymaker”
for the purpose of determining liability or by explaining how to show that a
particular policy directly caused constitutional violations. Instead, as the
Second Circuit notes in Walker v. City of New York:
The combination of [Tuttle, Pembaur, and Praprotnik] necessarily molds many
§ 1983 claims against municipalities into “failure to train” or “failure to supervise”
claims. It is only by casting claims in this way that plaintiffs can link an actual
116
decision by a high level municipal official to the challenged incident.

This is why prosecutorial liability cases like Connick and Van de
Kamp eventually became framed as § 1983 cases alleging that a district
attorney failed to train his subordinates properly. This group of cases
required plaintiffs to plead their claims as constitutional violations resulting
from a high-level municipal policymaker in order to succeed in a § 1983
action.
Justice Rehnquist’s opinion in Oklahoma City v. Tuttle found a single
incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer insufficient to
prove a failure to train. 117 There had to be some additional evidence to
show that “policymakers deliberately chose a training program which
would prove inadequate.” 118
Pembaur v. Cincinnati clarified that it was still possible for a single act
to give rise to liability, but only if it resulted from the decision of a

112

Monell, 436 U.S. at 665–89.
Id. at 691.
114
Id.
115
Id. at 694.
116
Walker v. City of New York, 974 F.2d 293, 297 (2d Cir. 1992).
117
City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 823–24 (1985). The widow of a man
shot and killed by a police officer brought suit under § 1983, asserting that the city’s policy
resulted in inadequate training for the officer who shot her husband, which in turn produced
a deprivation of her husband’s constitutional rights. Id. at 811–12.
118
Id. at 823 (emphasis added).
113
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municipal policymaker. 119 A plurality of the Court found that the police
had acted pursuant to the direction of the county prosecutor in executing an
arrest warrant. The county prosecutor, who was acting as county
policymaker, and the county could therefore be held liable.120 The plurality
suggested that the proper definition of a policymaker was “the
decisionmaker [who] possesses final authority to establish municipal policy
with respect to the action ordered.” 121
Again in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, a plurality of the Court
reaffirmed that state law decides who the policymaker is.122 Justice
Brennan’s concurrence indicated that state law was a starting point, but that
the fact-finder should determine where policymaking power actually lay. 123
Yet the plurality concluded that even when the policymaker delegated
decisions to subordinates, the municipality could be held liable.124
The following year, in Canton v. Harris, the Supreme Court specified
that a municipal policymaker had to show “deliberate indifference” to the
need to train his subordinates for the Court to find liability under § 1983.125
The Court found the city’s overall policy regarding the medical treatment of
persons in custody to be constitutional. 126 It determined that the city could
not be liable for an unconstitutional application of the policy that was
caused by a failure to train. 127 The Court held that “the inadequacy of
police training may serve as the basis for § 1983 liability only where the
failure to train amounts to deliberate indifference to the rights of persons
with whom the police come into contact.” 128 Additionally, only where
deliberate indifference to the need to train was the “moving force” behind

119

Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469, 480 (1986). In Pembaur, a doctor
brought a § 1983 action against the city of Cincinnati, the county of Hamilton, and others
based on police action taken in the execution of arrest warrants in his office. Id. at 473–74.
120
Id. at 474.
121
Id. at 481. But cf. id. at 498 (Powell, J., dissenting). “[The Court’s] reasoning is
circular: it contends that policy is what policymakers make, and policymakers are those who
have the authority to make policy.” Id.
122
City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 124 (1988). An architect employed by
the city of St. Louis filed suit against the city alleging a violation of his constitutional rights
during the course of his work for the city and in his eventual firing. Id. at 114–17.
123
Id. at 143 (Brennan, J., concurring).
124
Id. at 127.
125
489 U.S. 378, 388 (1989). Geraldine Harris alleged that Canton, Ohio’s policy
regarding medical treatment in police custody was unconstitutional and had resulted in
inadequate treatment for her while she was in police custody in violation of § 1983. Id. at
381.
126
Id. at 386.
127
Id. at 387.
128
Id. at 388.
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the constitutional violation is the municipality liable.129 One officer’s
unsatisfactory response to a situation is not necessarily a failure to train.130
However, in dicta, the Court explored the possibility of a situation
where “the need for more or different training [was] so obvious . . . that the
policymakers of the city can reasonably be said to have been deliberately
indifferent to the need.”131 The obvious need for training plus a single
incident of misconduct by a municipal actor could result in a constitutional
violation that would be actionable under § 1983 in at least one instance:
[C]ity policymakers know to a moral certainty that their police officers will be
required to arrest fleeing felons. The city has armed its officers with firearms, in part
to allow them to accomplish this task. Thus, the need to train officers in the
constitutional limitations on the use of deadly force can be said to be “so obvious,”
that failure to do so could properly be characterized as “deliberate indifference” to
132
constitutional rights.

In other words, if one police officer untrained in the constitutional
limits of deadly force were to shoot a fleeing suspect, in contravention of
Tennessee v. Garner, 133 that single incident would be enough to give rise to
municipal liability under § 1983.
Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Harris also introduced the idea of a
“pattern of constitutional violations” for the first time in Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 134 She argued that repeated constitutional violations by a
municipality’s employees would put the municipality “on notice that its
officers confront the particular situation on a regular basis, and that they
often react in a manner contrary to constitutional requirements.” 135 She
noted that lower courts that had adopted the “deliberate indifference”
requirement often used a pattern of violations to infer that deliberate
indifference was present. 136 The pattern requirement advocated by
O’Connor and the lower courts eventually became an official requirement
for proving deliberate indifference in Board of County Commissioners of
Bryan County v. Brown. 137
Bryan County considered a § 1983 claim resulting from a traffic stop
where a police officer forcibly removed a passenger from a vehicle,
129

Id. at 389.
Id. at 390–91.
131
Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
132
Id. at 390 n.10 (citations omitted).
133
471 U.S. 1, 21 (1985) (holding that the use of deadly force by an officer to apprehend
a suspect is subject to the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement).
134
Harris, 489 U.S. at 397 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
135
Id.
136
Id.
137
Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs of Bryan Cnty. v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 407–08 (1997).
130
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resulting in injuries. 138 The Court held that the county was not liable under
§ 1983 for the sheriff’s single decision to hire the officer who injured the
respondent, despite the officer’s violent history. 139 The hiring decision,
which was legal and constitutional, was not the “moving force,” or direct
cause, of the injuries. 140 To find deliberate indifference and hold the sheriff
liable under § 1983, the respondent could not just show that there was some
probability that an improperly reviewed hire would inflict an injury—she
had to show “that this officer was highly likely to inflict the particular
injury suffered by the plaintiff.” 141 Despite this officer’s allegedly violent
background, it was not “plainly obvious” to the sheriff when he hired the
officer that this history would result in constitutional violations.142
Deliberate indifference by the sheriff could have been proved by either a
“continued adherence to an approach that [he knew] or should [have
known] has failed to prevent tortious conduct by employees” or “the
existence of a pattern of tortious conduct by inadequately trained employees
[that] . . . is the ‘moving force’ behind the plaintiff’s injury.” 143 The Court
showed that it would be very reluctant to use a single-incident analysis to
hold municipalities liable under § 1983 without a very explicit causal
connection between the single incident (or single bad decision) and the
constitutional violation.
Tuttle, Pembaur, and Praprotnik framed municipal liability in terms of
“failure-to-train” claims. O’Connor’s concurrence in Harris and the
opinion in Bryan County established the necessity of a pattern of
constitutional violations in order to prove a failure to train, but Harris
raised the possibility of single-incident liability in cases of truly egregious
constitutional violations. These two alternatives for establishing municipal
liability under § 1983 set the stage for Connick v. Thompson.

138

Id. at 400–01. Respondent Jill Brown was the passenger in the car that her husband
was driving. Id. When he turned around to avoid a police checkpoint, he was pursued in a
high-speed chase by Deputy Sheriff Robert Morrison and Reserve Deputy Stacy Burns. Id.
Burns approached on Jill Brown’s side of the vehicle, and when she would not exit, he
forcibly pulled her out of the vehicle, resulting in severe knee injuries. Id. at 400–01. Burns
was the son of the nephew of the county sheriff. Id. at 401. He had a criminal record that
included several driving infractions and misdemeanors, including assault and battery. Id.
While that did not prevent him from being hired as a peace officer under Oklahoma law,
Brown argued that the sheriff had not adequately reviewed this background in making his
decision to hire Burns. Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 405.
141
Id. at 412.
142
Id.
143
Id. at 407–08.

2012]

SOMEBODY HELP ME UNDERSTAND THIS

1339

III. PROBLEMS WITH THE COURT’S APPROACH IN CONNICK
After reviewing both the prosecutorial immunity and municipal
liability precedent, the Supreme Court concluded in Connick that a district
attorney’s office could not be held liable under § 1983 for a Brady violation
by one of its assistant district attorneys. There are numerous problems with
how the Court arrived at this rule. First, the functional approach has proven
weak as a mechanism for determining when prosecutors should be given
qualified, rather than absolute, immunity. Second, the Court’s decisions
have yet to satisfactorily answer what a “pattern” of constitutional
violations giving rise to liability would look like. Third, the Court’s alleged
common law foundation for prosecutorial immunity is tenuous at best.
Ultimately, poorly reasoned decisions have granted prosecutors—and their
municipalities—de facto absolute immunity for their actions.
A. THE FAILINGS OF THE FUNCTIONAL TEST
The Supreme Court’s functional test for determining what type of
immunity applies to a prosecutor has been plagued with problems since
Imbler v. Pachtman. 144 As the Court applies the test to different factual
scenarios, its failings are readily clear. The federal circuits are specifically
struggling with the implications of the functional test in situations where
prosecutors not only hide exculpatory evidence, but also actively falsify
evidence. Falsification of evidence would likely take place during the
investigatory phase of a prosecution, when the prosecutor is only protected
by qualified immunity. However, the false evidence cannot actually be
used in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights until trial, when the
prosecutor is protected by absolute immunity. When the functional divide
is taken to its logical extent, it means that prosecutors are protected by
absolute immunity for falsifying evidence.
1. Practical Problems with the Functional Test
The functional test for determining liability has been criticized since
the days of Imbler. 145 The administrative, investigatory, and advocatory
lines cannot be drawn as clearly in the real world as the Supreme Court has
assumed. 146 As one author phrased it, “[t]he existence of cases defying
easy categorization reveals an inherent weakness in the functional
approach—the approach implicitly assumes that every prosecutorial act fits

144

424 U.S. 409 (1976).
See Anthony J. Luppino, Supplementing the Functional Test of Prosecutorial
Immunity, 34 STAN. L. REV. 487 (1982).
146
Id. at 504.
145
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in one, and only one, category.” 147
Additionally, the functional test creates an incentive for prosecutors to
claim that almost everything they do is a part of their function as advocates,
thus ensuring absolute immunity for their acts. Buckley v. Fitzsimmons148
helps make this easy for prosecutors. It stated the bright-line rule that “[a]
prosecutor neither is, nor should consider himself to be, an advocate before
he has probable cause to have anyone arrested.” 149 But there is “no useful
indication of at what point probable cause will be ‘had’ or who is to
determine its existence.” 150
The functional test gives criminal defendants-turned-claimants bad
incentives too. As Justice Kennedy noted in his dissent in Buckley, the
Court weakened its stance against the tort of malicious prosecution by
introducing this bright-line rule. 151 In Imbler, the Court had made it clear
that it wanted to preserve the common law absolute immunity for
prosecutors accused of malicious prosecution. 152 Buckley’s bright-line rule
ends up functioning as a pleading rule for claimants; as long as they include
at least some of a prosecutor’s pre-probable cause conduct in their
pleadings, malicious prosecution claims are no longer easily dismissed. 153
Instead, frivolous malicious prosecution claims survive longer in the courts
disguised as § 1983 claims.
Moreover, the distinction between advocatory acts and investigatory
acts is not principled—it has been described as “inherently elusive and
highly questionable.” 154 Kennedy’s dissent in Buckley points out that what
the Court labels “investigation” could easily be termed “preparation for
trial.” 155 Preparatory actions should be protected. They “must be free of

147

Id. at 493.
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 286–87 (1993); see also supra notes 94–99
and accompanying text (discussing Buckley).
149
Id. at 274; see also Megan M. Rose, Note, The Endurance of Prosecutorial
Immunity—How the Federal Courts Vitiated Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 37 B.C. L. REV. 1019,
1044 (1996).
150
Rose, supra note 149, at 1044.
151
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
152
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 421–28 (1976).
153
See Buckley, 509 U.S. at 286–87 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); James P. Kenner, Note,
Prosecutorial Immunity: Removal of the Shield Destroys the Effectiveness of the Sword, 33
WASHBURN L.J. 402, 426 (1994). But see Hartman v. Moore, 547 U.S. 250, 265 (2006)
(finding that the “presumption of regularity behind the charging decision” may be overcome
by showing a lack of probable cause in addition to a retaliatory motive of the prosecutor
bringing the charges).
154
Erwin Chemerinsky, Prosecutorial Immunity—The Interpretation Continues, TRIAL,
Mar. 1998, at 80, 80.
155
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 284 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
148
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the distortive effects of potential liability.”156 Otherwise, preparation is
punished. A prosecutor who has properly and extensively investigated his
case prior to a probable cause determination may find himself civilly liable
for his decisions and actions, which have all taken place in the
“investigatory” phase. Meanwhile, a prosecutor who does not open the case
file until after the probable cause determination is protected because all of
his decisions and actions are taking place in the “advocatory” phase.157
The Court justifies its investigatory/advocatory distinction by claiming
that it would be unfair to offer police officers only qualified immunity for
their investigative acts, while protecting prosecutors with absolute
immunity for the same acts. 158 However, that assumes that police and
prosecutors are engaging in the same function while engaged in the same
activity. 159 This may not be the case.160 The way that police officers and
prosecutors assess evidence is very different, because they are driven by
different goals. A police officer wants to establish probable cause to arrest
a suspect. 161 By contrast, a prosecutor has to look at the long-term picture
and assess how to turn evidence showing probable cause into a conviction
beyond a reasonable doubt. 162 Moreover, in an ideal world, a prosecutor is
not simply seeking another conviction; he is seeking to do justice.163 The
prosecutor has an ethical responsibility to seek out the truth of what
happened in the case and should not seek a conviction against a defendant
whom the prosecutor believes to be innocent.164
The distinction between advocatory acts and administrative acts is not
principled either. As long as a prosecutor can somehow link an
administrative act to the “conduct of a trial,” the utilization of “legal
knowledge,” or the “exercise of related discretion,” he or she is in the
clear. 165 This is not difficult to do. The Van de Kamp Court states:
Here, unlike other claims related to administrative decisions, an individual
prosecutor’s error in the plaintiff’s specific criminal trial constitutes an essential
element of the plaintiff’s claim. The administrative obligations at issue here are thus
156

Id.
See Kenner, supra note 153, at 426.
158
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 275.
159
Id. at 289 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
160
Id.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION (3d
ed. 1993).
164
Id.
165
Malia N. Brink, A Pendulum Swung Too Far: Why the Supreme Court Must Place
Limits on Prosecutorial Immunity, 4 CHARLESTON L. REV. 1, 7 (2009) (citing Van de Kamp
v. Goldstein, 129 S. Ct. 855, 862 (2009)).
157
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unlike administrative duties concerning, for example, workplace hiring, payroll
166
administration, the maintenance of physical facilities, and the like.

It would indeed be striking to see the case where a criminal defendant
brings a § 1983 action against a prosecutor’s office claiming that payroll
administration led to the violation of his constitutional rights. By narrowly
equating administrative functions with actions that will rarely, if ever,
impact a defendant, Van de Kamp has effectively closed off claims of
liability against prosecutors under a theory of qualified immunity for
administrative acts.
2. The Functional Test and the Falsification of Evidence
Beyond the problems noted above, perhaps the most egregious
practical problem with the functional test is that the test makes it unclear
whether prosecutors are liable under § 1983 for falsifying evidence and
presenting it at trial. It seems absurd that actions analogous to perjury
should be allowed to go unpunished. 167 But the Court’s functional
approach to prosecutorial immunity has led to some bizarre circular
reasoning in this area, best exemplified by Justice Scalia’s concurrence in
Buckley.168 Falsified evidence cannot produce harm to a defendant until it
is used. 169 When prosecutors are preparing false evidence during their
pretrial, pre-probable cause investigatory function, they are protected only
by qualified immunity. 170 But the harm from the false evidence does not
occur while it is being prepared—it occurs at trial, when the evidence is
used. Yet by the time the prosecutor is using the false evidence at trial, he
is protected by absolute immunity. 171
The circuits have split on how to approach this issue. The Second,
Eighth, and Ninth Circuits hold a prosecutor liable for producing false
evidence under a qualified immunity theory. 172 The Third and Seventh
166

Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 344 (2009).
There are many ways that prosecutors can falsify and present evidence at trial, but for
particular treatment of prosecutors’ knowing use of perjured testimony, see Charlie DeVore,
Comment, A Lie Is a Lie: An Argument for Strict Protection Against a Prosecutor’s
Knowing Use of Perjured Testimony, 101 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 667 (2011).
168
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 281 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring); see also
Jeffrey J. McKenna, Note, Prosecutorial Immunity: Imbler, Burns, and Now Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons—The Supreme Court’s Attempt to Provide Guidance in a Difficult Area, 1994
BYU L. REV. 663, 692–93 (reading Justice Scalia’s concurrence as saying that claims of
false evidence should be dismissed for failure to state a claim).
169
Buckley, 509 U.S. at 281.
170
Id.
171
Margaret Z. Johns, Reconsidering Absolute Prosecutorial Immunity, 2005 BYU L.
REV. 53, 92.
172
See McGhee v. Pottawattamie Cnty., 547 F.3d 922 (8th Cir. 2008); Milstein v.
167
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Circuits have held that a prosecutor is absolutely immune from liability for
presenting false evidence at trial. 173
Because of a fairly arbitrary test created by the Supreme Court, a
prosecutor can actually make up evidence, present it at trial, and not be held
civilly liable for his actions. The criminal defendant against whom the
evidence is presented is left without recourse. If he is wrongfully convicted
on the basis of false evidence, he may sit in prison for years. If he has a
dedicated legal team, perhaps he gets the conviction overturned and gets out
of prison sooner. But typically a defendant with a dedicated legal team is
not the type of defendant who has to worry about false evidence being used
against him without objection in the first place. If and when he gets out, he
may have no claim for civil damages for the prosecutor’s wrong.
Ultimately, the functional test leads to some defendants convicted on the
basis of false evidence spending years in prison for crimes that they did not
commit. 174
The Supreme Court could resolve the circuit split in two ways. First,
the Court could rule that prosecutors are absolutely immune for presenting
false evidence at trial.175 On the other hand, the Court could grant
prosecutors qualified immunity for their actions at all stages of a
prosecution, including trial, which would expose them to liability for
Cooley, 257 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2001); Zahrey v. Coffey, 221 F.3d 342 (2d Cir. 2000);
Ephraim Unell, A Right Not to Be Framed: Preserving Civil Liability of Prosecutors in the
Face of Absolute Immunity, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 955, 966 (2010); see also Johns, supra
note 171, at 90. Zahrey set the tone for this group of circuits. It concluded that the
falsification of evidence is itself the harm because the harm at trial is the “legally cognizable
result” of the falsification. Zahrey, 221 F.3d at 349–54; see also Unell, supra, at 964.
McGhee utilizes similar reasoning. McGhee, 547 F.3d at 932. Milstein cites heavily to
Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993), but arrives at the same conclusion. Milstein,
257 F.3d at 1011; see also Johns, supra note 171, at 95.
173
Michaels v. New Jersey, 222 F.3d 118 (3d Cir. 2000); Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 20
F.3d 789 (7th Cir. 1994); see also Unell, supra note 172, at 966–67. The Seventh Circuit
addressed the issue of prosecutors presenting false evidence at trial in Buckley after it was
remanded from the Supreme Court. Unell, supra note 172, at 964. It basically followed
Justice Scalia’s reasoning in Buckley, and added in the Buckley majority’s bright-line
probable cause rule. Id. The prosecutors in Buckley elicited false evidence prior to a finding
of probable cause, and were not absolutely immune. Id. But there was no harm at that
point—the harm occurred at trial, when absolute immunity applied. Id. The Supreme Court
declined to grant certiorari to Buckley a second time to resolve this. See Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 513 U.S. 1085 (1995). The Third Circuit later adopted similar reasoning in
Michaels. See Michaels, 222 F.3d at 122.
174
See, e.g., Buckley, 509 U.S. at 261 (Stephen Buckley spent three years in jail);
McGhee, 547 F.3d at 925 (Curtis McGhee and his codefendant Terry Harrington each spent
twenty-four years in prison); Michaels, 222 F.3d at 120 (Margaret Michaels spent six years
in prison).
175
See infra Part V.B for a discussion of some additional implications of this course of
action for prosecutors.
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falsifying evidence in violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights. 176
Considering how recently the Court upheld the functional test in Connick, it
is unlikely to resolve the circuit split over the falsification of evidence any
time soon.
B. WHAT IS A “PATTERN”?
Thirty-six years after Imbler, the Court has yet to articulate fully the
scope of qualified immunity for prosecutors. The discussion of the Connick
case at the appellate level demonstrates this.177 No one, including no
Justice on the Court, seems to know exactly what constitutes a “pattern” of
violations that shows deliberate indifference and leads to qualified
immunity and liability under § 1983. Connick v. Thompson evaluates
multiple scenarios that might establish a pattern, and the majority and
dissent appear to disagree on whether liability exists for every single one.
Unfortunately, the dissent itself is unclear on whether it is arguing for
liability based on a single incident or a pattern. The dissent spends a great
deal of time and space laying out the facts that the jury had available to
it 178—including other potential Brady violations that occurred in
Thompson’s case 179 and other cases in which Connick’s office was held
liable in civil suits for Brady violations. 180 Yet it summarily concludes that
the jury could have been holding Connick’s office liable based on a single

176
See infra Part V.A for a discussion of some additional implications of this course of
action for prosecutors.
177
See Thompson v. Connick, 578 F.3d 293 (5th Cir. 2009), rev’d, 131 S. Ct. 1350
(2011); see also Sophia Juliana Johnson, Thompson v. Connick: The Fifth Circuit Tiptoes
Around the Issue of Qualified Prosecutorial Immunity and Collapses Municipal and
Vicarious Liability Under § 1983, 84 TUL. L. REV. 1403 (2010) (describing how sixteen
appellate judges joined three separate opinions—one finding absolute immunity under Van
de Kamp, one finding that Thompson had failed to show evidence giving rise to singleincident liability, and one finding that the jury had sufficient evidence, in the form of a
pattern of violations, to reasonably infer that there was deliberate indifference).
178
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1370–77 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). The facts that
Ginsburg’s dissent selects from the trial record certainly appear, at first blush, to indicate that
there was other evidence concealed from Thompson’s defense team besides the lab report at
the center of the case. However, the majority is ultimately correct that if the dissent was
truly pursuing a single-incident theory of liability, these other concealed bits of evidence
would not matter. The hidden lab report alone would be enough for the liability analysis to
take place.
179
Id. at 1376 n.10.
180
Id. at 1370 (“As the trial record in the § 1983 action reveals, the conceded, longconcealed transgressions were neither isolated nor atypical.”); see also id. at 1382
(discussing the Supreme Court’s decision in Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995), which
reversed a capital conviction from Orleans Parish based on the withholding of exculpatory
evidence).
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incident. 181 The dissent never argues the obvious alternative—that the jury
clearly had enough additional information to find a pattern from the
multiple Brady violations occurring in Thompson’s case. This is
particularly frustrating because each time the majority dismisses a
definition of a pattern, the dissent’s factual evidence would seem to support
such a definition, but the dissent stops short of actually calling anything a
pattern.
The Connick majority takes the view that the actions of multiple
prosecutors in one case resulting in a single Brady violation, like in
Thompson’s case, do not constitute a pattern. 182 What if multiple
prosecutors violate Brady multiple times in one case? The majority swiftly
dismisses in a footnote the idea that such behavior constitutes a pattern. 183
Could multiple prosecutors violating Brady multiple times across multiple
cases prove a pattern? The majority indicates that this too is insufficient to
put a district attorney on notice of the need to train—at least in the case of
the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Thompson argued that
Connick’s office had been reversed on appeal for Brady violations four
times in the ten years prior to his armed robbery prosecution.184 Thomas’s
opinion discounts this because the reversed decisions did not involve the
hiding of scientific evidence, like the blood-type report in Thompson’s
case, but rather other forms of evidence.185 Thomas declines to state
whether, if the other four cases had involved scientific evidence, he would
have altered his opinion.
What does clearly emerge from the analysis of both opinions is that
what constitutes a pattern of constitutional violations is highly fact-bound.
The application of this precedent regarding pattern will be difficult to apply
to future cases. It is unclear that even the five Justices of the majority are
all in agreement as to what a pattern is; they just all happened to agree that
Thompson’s case did not prove it. 186
181

See id. at 1377.
Id. at 1360 n.7.
183
Id. (stating that “contemporaneous or subsequent conduct cannot establish a pattern of
violations”).
184
Id. at 1360.
185
Id.
186
Moreover, in this analysis I have been using the idea of a Brady violation because that
is what was at issue in Connick. In reality, of course, prosecutors can violate a defendant’s
constitutional rights in other ways as a result of a lack of training. When you add additional
types of constitutional violations into the mix, the fact-bound nature of this analysis becomes
even more complicated. For example, Prosecutor A and Prosecutor B try a case together. In
the first case, Prosecutor A withholds exculpatory blood evidence in violation of Brady and,
more generally, the defendant’s due process rights. At the same time, Prosecutor B prepares
a witness and withholds from the defense attorney the fact that he gave the witness immunity
182
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Both the majority and dissent fail to address two additional situations
that may reasonably constitute a pattern. First, one prosecutor could take
actions across multiple cases, resulting in multiple Brady violations.
Second, one prosecutor could take multiple actions in a single case that
result in multiple Brady violations. While there may be a “pattern” of
violations in both instances, they stem from the actions of a single person,
rather than a group. That single prosecutor probably fits within Justice
Scalia’s definition of the “miscreant prosecutor,”187 who may have some
form of personal responsibility for his actions, but whose actions would not
establish liability under § 1983 for the office generally.
Neither side is particularly clear on what a single incident that gives
rise to liability looks like either. It appears that a single incident could
produce liability in two ways. First, there is the hypothetical in footnote 10
of Harris. 188 Both sides agree that this is still good law. Second, the
majority in Connick seems to say that something other than a pattern could
give the district attorney a “specific reason” to know that additional training
was necessary. 189 The Court may have added this language to leave the
for his testimony. He does this in violation of Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150 (1972),
and the defendant’s due process rights. Neither prosecutor takes these actions in bad faith;
they simply did not receive the training they needed to know what to turn over. Is this a
pattern of constitutional violations? What if in the next case, A is paired with Prosecutor C,
and A makes the same Brady violation. B is paired with Prosecutor D on his next case, and
he too makes the same mistake with Giglio. Is this a pattern? Does that answer change if C
and D also make Brady and Giglio violations? How many times does a particular type of
violation have to occur in order to be a pattern? How does a defendant seeking to hold an
office liable even plead a failure to train in this situation? It is far easier to allege that
training is flawed in just one area of the law—either Brady or Giglio alone. Can a defendant
allege that all of an office’s training on constitutional rights is flawed? Is it even possible to
prove such a thing? Nothing in any of the two lines of cases leading up to Connick, or
Connick itself, suggests any answers to these questions. I suggest that is because the pattern
test is so heavily fact-bound as to be practically unworkable.
187
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1368 (Scalia, J., concurring).
188
City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378, 390 n.10 (1989). This is the only explicit
example of liability arising from a single incident in Supreme Court jurisprudence. The idea
expressed in footnote 10 is that a single incidence of misconduct by a municipal employee
resulting from an obvious failure in his training may be such a gross violation of a citizen’s
constitutional rights that the municipality can be found deliberately indifferent to the need to
train and can therefore be held liable under § 1983. Id. A municipality would be liable if it
gave its police officers weapons without training them to know when the use of deadly force
was acceptable, and an officer shot and killed someone when deadly force was not needed.
Id.
189
Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1363 (“A district attorney is entitled to rely on prosecutors’
professional training and ethical obligations in the absence of specific reason, such as a
pattern of violations, to believe that those tools are insufficient to prevent future
constitutional violations . . . .” (emphasis added)); see also id. at 1386 n.26 (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting).
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door open for prosecutorial liability—since its reasoning basically
eviscerated Harris’s single-incident theory as applied to prosecutors. This
is because assistant district attorneys will always have attended law school
and passed the bar, 190 so the district attorney will always be free to presume,
under Connick, that they have adequate legal training to deal with Brady
issues. So the “specific reason” that tips off the district attorney that more
training is needed must be something other than inadequate training. 191 The
dissent argues that footnote 10 in Harris is directly applicable to
Thompson’s case because, although young lawyers have been to law school
and passed the bar, they do not necessarily know everything about the law
that is required to do their jobs. 192
C. RECONSIDERING THE COMMON LAW FOUNDATION OF THE
RULE
The practical effect of all of this confusion is that prosecutors have
absolute immunity. Is that such a bad thing? After all, the Court has
repeatedly stated that in American common law, prosecutors always had
absolute immunity. Imbler relied heavily on common law reasoning to
establish the functional test.193
Section 1983 does not list any immunities at all,194 but the Court has
simply read the immunities available under the common law of 1871 (when
§ 1983 was passed) into the statute. 195 While this approach is certainly
artificial, it is something the Court has done in the past to reach a desired
result. 196 Unfortunately, in the prosecutorial immunity context, this
approach makes no sense. In Imbler, after stating that prosecutors were
absolutely immune under the common law of 1871, the Court cites as
evidence Griffith v. Slinkard, a case of malicious prosecution from 1896. 197
190

See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
See Connick, 131 S. Ct. at 1386 n.26 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“In the end, the
majority leaves open the possibility that something other than ‘a pattern of violations’ could
also give the district attorney ‘specific reason’ to know that additional training is necessary.
Connick, by his own admission, had such a reason.” (citations omitted)).
192
See id. at 1386; supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
193
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 422–27 (1976).
194
See id. at 417.
195
See id. at 418.
196
See, e.g., Pierson v. Ray 386 U.S. 547 (1967) (reading common law absolute
immunity for judges into § 1983); Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367 (1951) (reading
common law absolute immunity for legislators into § 1983). In Tenney, the Court concluded
that immunities “well grounded in history and reason” had not been abrogated “by covert
inclusion in the general language” of § 1983. Imbler, 424 U.S. at 418 (quoting Tenney, 341
U.S. at 376).
197
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 421 (citing Griffith v. Slinkard, 44 N.E. 1001 (Ind. 1896)).
191
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Moreover, the Court concedes that Griffith was the first recorded case
where absolute prosecutorial immunity is mentioned in American law. 198
Justice Scalia’s concurrence in Burns is more effective at describing
the common law immunities than the majority in Imbler, but his argument
still lacks persuasiveness as to why prosecutorial immunity should be read
into § 1983. In American common law, there was absolute immunity for
judges acting in their official judicial capacities. 199 There was also absolute
immunity for government servants acting in a “quasi-judicial” capacity. 200
Finally, all statements made as part of a court proceeding were given
absolute immunity from defamation suits.201
The Imbler Court argued that absolute immunity should apply to
prosecutors for the same policy reasons that absolute immunity is given to
judges and jurors. 202 In short, the immunity is designed to prevent the
harassment of all parties to the prosecution and avoid any chilling effects
that litigation might have. 203 The Court seemed to endorse the idea that
prosecutors share absolute immunity protection under a quasi-judicial
theory. 204 However, that is not the same thing as a grant of absolute
immunity at common law for prosecutors in their own right. Yet the
Court’s jurisprudence has simplified the common law reasoning to this end.
If the Court were to acknowledge the tenuousness of its common law
arguments, the justification for absolute immunity and the functional test
weakens considerably.
Even assuming that the Court’s suppositions about absolute immunity
in 1871 are correct, do we want modern prosecutors subjected to a rule
198

See id. at 420–21.
Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 499 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part) (citing THOMAS COOLEY, THE LAW OF TORTS (1880)). From its earliest days, English
common law protected judges acting within their jurisdiction with absolute immunity. See
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20 (citing Floyd v. Barker, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305). The United
States Supreme Court first recognized judicial absolute immunity in Bradley v. Fisher, 80
U.S. 335 (1871), but it was not until Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), that judicial
absolute immunity was applied to the states via § 1983. Pierson, 386 U.S. at 554–55.
200
Burns, 500 U.S. at 500 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The
Court in Imbler also noted that grand jurors received absolute immunity at both English and
American common law under a quasi-judicial theory. See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423 n.20
(citing Turpen v. Booth, 56 Cal. 65 (1880); Hunter v. Mathis, 40 Ind. 356 (1872); Floyd v.
Barker, (1608) 77 Eng. Rep. 1305).
201
Burns, 500 U.S. at 501 (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
However, a complaining witness could be subject to liability for malicious prosecution
(which, unlike defamation, was an intentional tort). Id. Indeed, the absolute immunity
applied only to defamation suits. Id.
202
Imbler, 424 U.S. at 422–23.
203
Id.
204
Id.
199
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created at a time when prosecution looked very different than it does today?
First, with the rise of DNA and other scientific technology, there have been
major advances in the collection of evidence since the common law rules
regarding prosecutors were developed. Because there are so many more
types of forensic evidence available to prosecutors today, there are also
more opportunities for them to hide or tamper with that evidence.
Additionally, prosecutors today are saddled with enormous caseloads that
simply did not exist when the common law was developing. 205 There are
more incentives now than ever before to cut corners in order to obtain
convictions and speed up the trial process. 206 Prosecutors’ offices do not
have the resources to handle the extraordinary number of cases. 207 To
maintain conviction rates, the temptation to conceal exculpatory evidence in
violation of a defendant’s constitutional rights is strong. 208 However,
despite the drastic differences between early and modern American
prosecution, there are compelling reasons for the Court to institute an
absolute immunity rule today.
IV. ALTERNATIVE PROPOSALS
There are plenty of ways to regulate prosecutors without overhauling
Supreme Court precedent. But having the Court impose a new immunity
rule will be more efficient, while also avoiding the significant
disadvantages of the common reform proposals. While they intuitively
seem sound, the proposed reforms have severe practical disadvantages that
prevent them from being viable alternatives to a new rule from the Court.
The most common proposals for regulation are more stringent or better

205

STEVEN W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, PROSECUTORS IN STATE COURTS, 2007 (2011). State prosecutors closed 2.9 million
felony cases in 2007, approximately ninety-four felony cases for every prosecuting attorney
on staff. Id.; see also Adam M. Gershowitz & Laura R. Killinger, The State (Never) Rests:
How Excessive Prosecutorial Caseloads Harm Criminal Defendants, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
261 (2011) (discussing the number of cases assigned to prosecutors in the largest
prosecutors’ offices in the country, and the broad negative impact that such caseloads have
on the criminal justice system).
206
See Bennett L. Gershman, Litigating Brady v. Maryland: Games Prosecutors Play, 57
CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 560 (2007) (“[P]rosecutors are well aware that continuing to
withhold favorable evidence may enhance the opportunity for a guilty plea and may also
impair a defendant’s pretrial preparation.”); Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 205, at 282–
85 (describing specifically how excessive caseloads prevent prosecutors from turning over
Brady material to criminal defendants).
207
See Gershowitz & Killinger, supra note 205, at 275–76.
208
See Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 355, 390 (2001) (“The desire to win inevitably wins out over matters of
procedural fairness, such as disclosure.”).
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enforced ethical sanctions 209 and internal office reforms, 210 although
multiple other mechanisms have been suggested. 211
209
See Angela J. Davis, The Legal Profession’s Failure to Discipline Unethical
Prosecutors, 36 HOFSTRA L. REV. 275 (2007); Peter A. Joy, The Relationship Between
Prosecutorial Misconduct and Wrongful Convictions: Shaping Remedies for a Broken
System, 2006 WIS. L. REV. 399; Richard A. Rosen, Disciplinary Sanctions Against
Prosecutors for Brady Violations: A Paper Tiger, 65 N.C. L. REV. 693 (1987); Walter W.
Steele, Jr., Unethical Prosecutors and Inadequate Discipline, 38 SW. L.J. 965 (1984); Fred
C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REV. 721 (2001); Fred
C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The Duty to Avoid Wrongful Convictions: A Thought
Experiment in the Regulation of Prosecutors, 89 B.U. L. REV. 1 (2009); Lesley E. Williams,
Note, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441 (1999).
210
See Rachel E. Barkow, Organizational Guidelines for the Prosecutor’s Office, 31
CARDOZO L. REV. 2089, 2105–12 (2010) (advocating a corporate compliance model for
structuring prosecutors’ offices); Stephanos Bibas, Prosecutorial Regulation Versus
Prosecutorial Accountability, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 959, 996–1016 (2009) (advocating internal
restructuring of prosecutors’ offices); Angela J. Davis, The American Prosecutor:
Independence, Power, and the Threat of Tyranny, 86 IOWA L. REV. 393, 460–64 (2001)
(advocating public information departments and prosecution review boards); Bennett L.
Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REV. 393, 448–58 (1992) (advocating
expanded discovery, prosecutor misconduct commissions, and movement toward the British
model, which relies partly on private lawyers drafted by the government to handle cases on a
piecemeal basis); Bruce A. Green, Beyond Training Prosecutors About Their Disclosure
Obligations: Can Prosecutors’ Offices Learn from Their Lawyers’ Mistakes?, 31 CARDOZO
L. REV. 2161, 2182–86 (2010) (advocating greater auditing of prosecutors’ files, more
extensive internal review, and establishing review processes that make it possible to admit
that wrongdoing occurred so that it can be addressed before the case goes too far in the
appeals process); Daniel S. Medwed, The Zeal Deal: Prosecutorial Resistance to PostConviction Claims of Innocence, 84 B.U. L. REV. 125, 169–81 (2004) [hereinafter The Zeal
Deal] (advocating better training, incentives, independent internal innocence units to review
claims, restructuring elections, and abandoning the public prosecutor model altogether in
favor of the British model, which has some public prosecution but relies partly on private
lawyers drafted by the government to handle cases on a piecemeal basis); Daniel S. Medwed,
The Prosecutor as Minister of Justice: Preaching to the Unconverted from the PostConviction Pulpit, 84 WASH. L. REV. 35, 58–65 (2009) [hereinafter Minister of Justice]
(advocating independent internal innocence units); Scott J. Krischke, Note, Absent
Accountability: How Prosecutorial Impunity Hinders the Fair Administration of Justice in
America, 19 J.L. & POL’Y 395, 432–34 (2010) (advocating federal- and state-level legislation
to regulate prosecutors, independent review boards attached to all prosecutors’ offices, and
criminal sanctions for misbehaving prosecutors); Lyn M. Morton, Note, Seeking the Elusive
Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct: Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1083, 1114–15 (1994) (advocating a prosecutorial conduct commission—
analogous to a state inspector general—that would investigate misconduct); Andrew Smith,
Note, Brady Obligations, Criminal Sanctions, and Solutions in a New Era of Scrutiny, 61
VAND. L. REV. 1935, 1960–72 (2008) (advocating open-file policies, better enforcement of
criminal sanctions against prosecutors, greater internal regulation, and increased media
transparency).
211
See Stephanos Bibas, Rewarding Prosecutors for Performance, 6 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L.
441, 448–51 (2009) (paying monetary incentives to prosecutors based on ethical
performance); Geoffrey S. Corn & Adam M. Gershowitz, Imputed Liability for Supervising
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If prosecutorial immunity continues to have a wide scope under
§ 1983, ethical sanctions may be the only way to address prosecutorial
misbehavior and mete out punishment. Part of the Imbler Court’s reasoning
for broadly allowing absolute immunity was that the profession would
sanction prosecutors who crossed ethical lines, even if they could not be
held civilly liable. 212 Unfortunately, in the thirty-six years since Imbler,
prosecution of prosecutors for ethical violations has been rare in
comparison with the number of ethical violations that occur.213 Selfregulation has not changed behavior because prosecutors are well aware
that, in practice, they are unlikely to face any professional consequences for
skirting ethical rules. 214
Prosecutors: Applying the Military Doctrine of Command Responsibility to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 14 BERKELEY J. CRIM. L. 395, 426–30 (2009) (advocating holding
supervisors responsible for subordinates’ misconduct that they knew or should have known
occurred); Adam M. Gershowitz, Prosecutorial Shaming: Naming Attorneys to Reduce
Prosecutorial Misconduct, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1059, 1088–93 (2009) (naming
prosecutors who engage in misconduct in appeals decisions overturning those cases); Janet
C. Hoeffel, Prosecutorial Discretion at the Core: The Good Prosecutor Meets Brady, 109
PENN ST. L. REV. 1133, 1151–54 (2005) (suggesting abolishing the public prosecutor and
moving to the English system); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for Good Behavior: Influencing
Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 851,
901–11 (1995) (advocating financial awards for prosecutors whose cases make it through
appeals without error); Sonja B. Starr, Sentence Reduction as a Remedy for Prosecutorial
Misconduct, 97 GEO. L.J. 1509, 1532–48 (2009) (reducing the defendant’s sentence in cases
where misconduct has occurred); Abby L. Dennis, Note, Reining in the Minister of Justice:
Prosecutorial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 155–61 (2007) (using
the superseder power, in which a district attorney, judge, or state executive appoints a special
prosecutor to “supersede” local prosecuting attorneys when misconduct has been
discovered); Kelly Gier, Note, Prosecuting Injustice: Consequences of Misconduct, 33 AM.
J. CRIM. L. 191, 205–12 (2006) (proposing a mixture of increased ethical scrutiny and
internal office reforms, including keeping repeat offenders off of death penalty cases,
protecting whistleblowers more effectively, and preventing offenders from entering top
positions within the prosecutor’s office); Moshe Zvi Marvit, Note, Who’s Afraid of
Municipal Liability? The Supreme Court’s Strange Exclusion of § 1983 Respondeat Superior
Municipal Liability, 37 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 461, 477–90 (2011) (interpreting § 1983 as
allowing municipalities to be held liable under a theory of respondeat superior).
212
Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 429 (1976).
213
See KATHLEEN M. RIDOLFI & MAURICE POSSLEY, N. CAL. INNOCENCE PROJECT,
PREVENTABLE ERROR: A REPORT ON PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT IN CALIFORNIA 1997–
2009 (2010), available at http://law.scu.edu/ncip/file/ProsecutorialMisconduct_BookEntire_
online%20version.pdf; Rosen, supra note 209; Joseph R. Weeks, No Wrong Without a
Remedy: The Effective Enforcement of the Duty of Prosecutors to Disclose Exculpatory
Evidence, 22 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 833 (1997); Ken Armstrong & Maurice Possley, Trial
& Error: How Prosecutors Sacrifice Justice to Win, CHI. TRIB., Jan. 10, 1999, at 1.
214
Ellen Yaroshefsky, Wrongful Convictions: It Is Time to Take Prosecution Discipline
Seriously, 8 D.C. L. REV. 275, 294 (2004) (noting that there is a “human tendency to push
margins when there are no sufficiently demanding external controls”); see also Joy, supra
note 209, at 426–27.
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If courts and the profession will not address misconduct, the next step
may be to force prosecutors’ offices to self-regulate internally. A common
suggestion is that prosecutors’ offices move to an open-file system, in
which any and all discovery is handed over to defense counsel. 215 At least
one author has suggested that offices move to a corporate compliance-style
model to ensure greater accountability by assistant district attorneys. 216
Several authors have advocated for internal review boards that would
investigate wrongful convictions and address prosecutors’ ethical
failings. 217 These suggestions are severely limited by the fact that district
attorneys have little incentive to implement complex and costly internal
reforms without substantive data indicating that the reforms produce
results. 218 The overwhelming number of cases that the typical prosecutor’s
office charges in a year, without an accompanying increase in funding,
leaves neither money nor time to deal with an overhaul of internal
processes. 219
Moreover, a problem inherent across these proposals is that the
institutions that would have to implement the reforms—whether the
prosecutors’ offices themselves or legislatures—are resistant to change. 220
Prosecutors dealing with massive caseloads and politicians deadlocked over
state budget concerns in a stagnant economy are not going to expend time,
energy, and political capital dealing with violations of criminal defendants’
constitutional rights. 221 Whether right or wrong, the political will to

215
See, e.g., Daniel S. Medwed, Brady’s Bunch of Flaws, 67 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1533
(2010); Gershman, supra note 206, at 449–51; Smith, supra note 210, at 1960–66.
216
See Barkow, supra note 210, at 2105–12 (advocating that prosecutors’ offices utilize
training, supervision, transparency, and reporting in the way that a corporation would in
order to avoid wrongdoing).
217
See Bibas, supra note 210; Davis, supra note 210; Gershman, supra note 210; Green,
supra note 210; Medwed, The Zeal Deal, supra note 210; Medwed, Minister of Justice,
supra note 210; Krischke, supra note 210; Morton, supra note 210; Smith, supra note 210.
218
To my knowledge, there is no comprehensive study measuring a decrease in wrongful
convictions in prosecutors’ offices that have instituted some form of internal reform. For
additional institutional characteristics that inhibit reform, see Green, supra note 210, at
2171–73 (describing the general skepticism and conservatism that mark prosecutors’
offices).
219
See generally PERRY & BANKS, supra note 205 (finding that while the total operating
budget of state prosecutors’ offices had decreased by 5% from 2001 to 2007, there were
approximately ninety-four felony cases charged per prosecuting attorney on staff).
220
See Green, supra note 210, at 2171–73.
221
This is not to say that they do not care about these issues at all, just that other
concerns tend to take precedence. District attorneys and legislators are elected officials, and
convicted criminals cannot vote and criminal defendants do not make up a politically active
constituency. Politicians have little incentive to champion major reforms to benefit criminal
defendants. For a more thorough treatment of how political concerns can impact criminal

2012]

SOMEBODY HELP ME UNDERSTAND THIS

1353

execute these reforms simply does not exist—making action by the
Supreme Court all the more necessary.
V. THE SUPREME COURT MUST IMPOSE A NEW RULE IN THIS AREA
The unsuitability of these alternative potential reforms means that the
Supreme Court must be responsible for implementing a coherent liability
rule. If the Supreme Court is truly to simplify the issue of prosecutorial
liability under § 1983 by eliminating the functional test, it has two options.
First, it could grant prosecutors qualified immunity across the board.
Alternatively, the Court could give prosecutors absolute immunity in all
situations. The absolute immunity rule already exists in practice, and there
are compelling reasons for the Court to make it official.
A. QUALIFIED IMMUNITY
Broad qualified immunity for prosecutors is another favored solution
among academics for reducing constitutional violations during
prosecution. 222 Protection from police misconduct under § 1983 is more
rigorous than protection from prosecutorial misconduct under the same
statute because the police may only invoke qualified immunity as a
defense. 223 If prosecutors were as carefully scrutinized as the police, so the
argument goes, they might have less incentive to violate defendants’
constitutional rights in the course of the trial. This would lower the rate of
wrongful convictions and bring greater fairness to the criminal adjudicatory
process.
The primary problem with qualified immunity for prosecutors is that it
may have a chilling effect on how prosecutors choose to prosecute. 224 If
prosecutors worry about being held civilly liable for their actions during a
law, see William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV.
505, 529–39 (2001).
222
Margaret Z. Johns, Unsupportable and Unjustified: A Critique of Absolute
Prosecutorial Immunity, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 509, 527–35 (2011); Douglas J. McNamara,
Buckley, Imbler, and Stare Decisis: The Present Predicament of Prosecutorial Immunity
and an End to Its Absolute Means, 59 ALB. L. REV. 1135, 1190–92 (1996); Williams, supra
note 209, at 3479–80. Other authors, while not advocating qualified immunity for
prosecutors in all situations, have argued that the current absolute immunity that is
sometimes granted needs to be restricted. See Brink, supra note 165, at 31–36; Unell, supra
note 172, at 967–69.
223
Compare Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976) (giving prosecutors absolute
immunity for their activities as advocates and qualified immunity for investigative and
administrative actions), with Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635 (1987) (granting police
officers qualified immunity based on whether they behaved reasonably in light of clearly
established law and the circumstances).
224
See Imbler, 424 U.S. at 423–24.
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prosecution, it may change their behavior in a way that leads to less zealous
advocacy. 225 This was a major concern of the Imbler Court, and has been
reiterated throughout the Court’s prosecutorial immunity jurisprudence
since 1976. 226
Moreover, another Supreme Court decision may lessen the desired
impact of qualified immunity on prosecutors’ behavior. In Heck v.
Humphrey, 227 the Court held that to recover damages under § 1983, a
plaintiff must show that his conviction was reversed on direct appeal,
expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal, or called
into question by a federal court’s writ of habeas corpus. 228 Even if
misconduct occurred in a defendant’s case, the defendant has to prove that
it was so egregious that it affected the verdict. 229 The subsequent retrial
must then lead to a reversal of the verdict. 230 This is a very high standard
for defendants to meet, and their success is particularly dependent on the
legal resources that are available to them. Instituting qualified immunity
may just lead prosecutors to engage in balancing. They will weigh the
chances that their behavior will lead to reversal on appeal, actually giving
rise to liability for their actions. If the prosecutor finds the likelihood of
reversal sufficiently low, or is willing to take the risk, a significant amount
of misconduct will occur regardless of the qualified immunity rule.231
B. ABSOLUTE IMMUNITY
Giving prosecutors absolute immunity for all of their actions has not
been advocated by anyone—except perhaps the Supreme Court, whose
decisions produce absolute immunity in effect if not in form. 232 The
225

Id.
See id.; see also Van de Kamp v. Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 346–47 (2009); Buckley v.
Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259, 270 n.4 (1993).
227
512 U.S. 477 (1994).
228
Id. at 486–87.
229
Id. For the requirements to achieve a reversal based on the withholding of
exculpatory evidence, see United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667 (1985) (holding that a
prosecutor’s withholding of exculpatory evidence is “material” such that it affects the verdict
and warrants reversal only if there is a reasonable probability that had the evidence been
disclosed to the defense, the outcome of the trial would have been different).
230
Heck, 512 U.S. at 486–87.
231
For an argument that prosecutors already engage in this type of balancing, see
Gershman, supra note 206, at 548–50. Bagley’s materiality standard, “allow[s] prosecutors
to play and frequently beat the odds that their suppression of evidence, even if discovered,
will be found immaterial by a court.” Id. at 549.
232
But see Lawrence Rosenthal, Second Thoughts on Damages for Wrongful
Convictions, 85 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 127, 152–61 (2010). While Rosenthal is highly critical
of the impact that a broad qualified immunity rule would have, he stops short of actually
advocating for straight absolute immunity.
226
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obvious problem with an absolute immunity rule is that a criminal
defendant wrongly convicted based on misconduct directly attributable to
his prosecutor has no recourse for the violation of his constitutional rights.
This would be less worrisome if prosecutors were routinely held
accountable for their actions through professional disciplinary measures.
However, prosecutors are very rarely called before disciplinary committees
for their actions, and are even more rarely disbarred. 233
In spite of this, the Supreme Court should scrap its prior jurisprudence
and articulate a rule that provides absolute immunity for prosecutors in all
situations. While not a perfect solution, absolute immunity has many
advantages over the current rule of mixed absolute and qualified immunity,
and is pragmatically more appropriate than a qualified immunity rule.
First, instituting absolute immunity in all instances would clear up the
muddy waters of the law. Judges would have a rule that is simple to
apply 234: prosecutors’ offices and municipalities have no liability, and
therefore no exposure to multimillion-dollar judgments. 235 Defense
attorneys and defendants will not spend years engaged in additional
litigation after the reversal of a conviction, only to lose a civil suit because
both sides had difficulty interpreting and applying the standard. 236 Finally,
absolute immunity is in complete accord with the common law tradition.237
Second, the twenty-four-hour news cycle helps make an absolute
immunity rule viable by providing a layer of accountability. The intense
scrutiny that all elected officials, including district attorneys, are subject to
today was completely unknown to the worlds of Imbler and the common
law. It is much easier for citizens to track how their elected officials are
behaving, make decisions about how to vote, and demand greater
transparency in government.
Americans are taking greater notice of the criminal justice system’s
failings, and the media has played a major role in that. Various innocence
projects across the country have taught the public what wrongful
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See supra notes 212–214 and accompanying text.
For why this is both an important and needed development, see note 177 and
accompanying text.
235
See infra notes 250–252 and accompanying text.
236
Note that John Thompson spent twenty-six years of his life engaged in litigation—
criminal and civil—with the Orleans Parish District Attorney’s Office. Eight of those years
(and presumably the sort of hours on the part of his attorneys that would normally result in
millions of dollars in fees) were spent on his § 1983 action, which the Supreme Court
eventually threw out, along with his $14 million in damages.
237
Although as I have suggested, supra Part III.C, the Court’s interpretation of the
common law of prosecutorial immunity is tenuous at best, and probably of little practical
value given the complexity of the prosecutorial function today.
234
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convictions are, how they happen, and how they destroy lives. 238
Campaigns to save death row inmates from execution when the evidence
against them is weak are becoming more prominent. 239 In some states, the
worry about wrongful convictions has become so great that the death
penalty has been abolished or suspended altogether. 240 Inevitably, this
intense scrutiny leads to the prosecutors of wrongful convictions being
publicly named by the media. 241 This makes it harder for their offices to
either cover up their behavior or continue their employment. The public
naming and subsequent shaming of prosecutors who engage in ethically
questionable behavior will provide a deterrent to others considering such
behavior.
But will this deterrent effect be enough? 242 Bad press affects an
elected district attorney the most, but it is his subordinates who are really
making the daily decisions that violate constitutional rights. For all of the
talk about “policymakers” and supervisors in the case law, the decision to
engage in unethical behavior is made by the one or two line prosecutors
who try the defendant’s case. They are not elected, and so may not care
much about bad press. They may see their jobs as engaging in a quest for
justice, and they may believe that the ends justify the means in such a
238

See About the Organization: Other Projects Around the World, INNOCENCE PROJECT,
http://www.innocenceproject.org/about/Other-Projects.php (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
239
The recent campaign to save Troy Davis, spearheaded by Amnesty International, is an
excellent example of this phenomenon. Troy Davis was convicted of first-degree murder in
Georgia and spent many years on death row while exhausting all of his appeals. See Troy
Davis, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Troy_Davis (last visited Oct. 30, 2012).
During this process, nearly all of the prosecution’s witnesses against him recanted their
original testimony. Id. Nonetheless, his conviction was upheld multiple times and he was
not granted clemency. Id. Davis was executed by the State of Georgia on September 21,
2011. Id.
240
These include: Alaska, Hawaii, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan,
Minnesota, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Rhode Island, Vermont, West Virginia,
and Wisconsin, in addition to the District of Columbia. See DEATH PENALTY INFO. CTR.,
FACTS ABOUT THE DEATH PENALTY (Oct. 5, 2012), available at http://www.deathpenalty
info.org/documents/FactSheet.pdf. New Mexico and Connecticut have abolished the death
penalty, but since the legislation is not retroactive, some inmates remain on death row. Id.
241
It will be the media doing the naming, too—even in appeals cases where judges take
prosecutors to task for misbehavior, they rarely name the prosecutors. See Gershowitz,
supra note 211, at 1062. But see David Lat, Benchslap of the Day: Say My Name, Say My
Name, ABOVE THE LAW (Feb. 16, 2012, 6:18 PM), http://abovethelaw.com/2012/02/bench
slap-of-the-day-say-my-name-say-my-name/#more-136265. Of course, judges are members
of the same profession as prosecutors. Members of the news media are not constrained by
such ties.
242
Moreover, the media’s power can be a double-edged sword. Brink has noted that
increased media attention may also pressure prosecutors “to bring charges quickly and to
win convictions.” Brink, supra note 165, at 12. Such a situation may encourage
misconduct, rather than eliminate it. See id. at 9.
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pursuit. 243 Moreover, criminal defendants are not a sympathetic group—
those who share an office and a community with these prosecutors may
support a conviction at any cost.244
But absolute immunity should be conferred on prosecutors not only for
its advantages, but also because of the severe disadvantages of the current
qualified immunity rule. Despite the tendency of the literature to bemoan
even the current absolute immunity of prosecutors, which is limited to their
advocatory functions, there are major drawbacks to making prosecutors
liable for misconduct under a qualified immunity rule. First, there is
substantial evidence that awarding money damages in § 1983 cases will
have little or no impact on prosecutorial behavior. 245 This is in part because
the prosecutor who actually violated the defendant’s constitutional rights is
not personally liable for paying the damages awarded to the plaintiff in
subsequent litigation. 246 It is strategically more sensible to go after an
entire office rather than an individual prosecutor because the prosecutor will
rarely have deep enough pockets to satisfy the type of judgment that a
Additionally, the
defendant-turned-civil-litigant will be seeking. 247
combination of the Imbler and Monell lines of cases has made it easier for
litigants to frame alleged § 1983 violations by prosecutors as “failure to
train” claims, which implicate a policymaker and the office more
broadly. 248 So even under a qualified immunity rule, prosecutors’ personal
wealth is not at stake in civil litigation, which makes the threat of litigation
less likely to directly impact their behavior during criminal trials.249
Within municipalities, prosecutors’ offices are not moneymakers.
They have to be allocated money for their operating costs every year out of
the municipality’s budget. Municipalities typically raise money through a
variety of taxes—property, sales, etc. Because prosecutors’ offices raise no
money independently, the municipality is also going to be responsible for
paying—with taxpayer money—any jury awards of civil damages against
243
See Medwed, The Zeal Deal, supra note 210, at 134–48, for a thorough description of
the culture of prosecutors’ offices and how that leads prosecutors to engage in misconduct
and prevents them from correcting their mistakes when they may have convicted an innocent
person.
244
See also infra Conclusion.
245
See Rosenthal, supra note 232, at 152–61.
246
Id. at 152. The other thing a prosecutor might have to lose is his job. But the reality
is that prosecutorial misconduct often takes years to be discovered. The subsequent civil
litigation takes additional years. Many prosecutors will have moved on by the time a
judgment is actually entered on a civil case awarding damages.
247
Compare John Thompson’s jury award of $14 million with the average salary of a
District Attorney in 2007, which was $98,000. See PERRY & BANKS, supra note 205, at 2.
248
See supra Part II.
249
See Rosenthal, supra note 232, at 129–30.
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prosecutors. 250 When taxpayers see their money paying for prosecutors’
mistakes, they may translate their outrage into votes against the elected
district attorney and the district attorney will have greater incentive to
punish misbehaving prosecutors. But this assumes that voters will make the
necessary connections among events. Although subject to direct political
pressure from the municipality about budget and spending, the district
attorney is primarily concerned about getting enough votes to get
reelected. 251 If voters are not making the connection between their tax
dollars and prosecutorial misconduct, the district attorney is in the clear.
Moreover, the average prosecutor making an in-the-moment call about
whether to withhold exculpatory evidence, for example, is so far removed
from municipal budget decisions that he or she is unlikely to feel pressured
one way or another by a threat of civil liability. 252
The cost of prosecution is only a fraction of a municipality’s budget.
Especially since the economic downturn began in 2008, many
municipalities have experienced budget difficulties.253 When budgets are
stretched so thin, it quickly becomes apparent that money spent paying civil
damages is money that is not being spent on schools, roads, and other
government services. 254 But if someone’s constitutional rights have been
violated, how can the courts not give them redress? Well, a multimilliondollar civil award to recompense one defendant for his violated rights
means that millions of dollars are not getting spent on entities like public
defenders’ offices that help protect hundreds of defendants’ constitutional
rights every day.
But let us suppose for a moment that despite all of these concerns, the
Supreme Court adopts a broad qualified immunity rule and prosecutors
finally feel the pressure of impending punishment for misbehavior. The
district attorney makes it clear to his subordinates that any future
misconduct may result in large civil damages against the office. The
unspoken implication is that the line prosecutor who engages in this
misconduct will be placing her job and reputation in jeopardy. What are the
prosecutor’s incentives going forward? Obviously, she will want to avoid
having a conviction overturned because of misconduct at all costs.
Intuitively that seems like a good thing. But at least some prosecutors will
engage in misconduct anyway—whether by accident, because they think
250

See id. at 134–35.
See id. at 153–54; see also Stuntz, supra note 221, at 533–34.
252
See Rosenthal, supra note 232, at 158–59.
253
See Richard W. Trotter, Running on Empty: Municipal Insolvency and Rejection of
Collective Bargaining Agreements in Chapter 9 Bankruptcy, 36 S. ILL. U. L.J. 45, 45–46
(2011).
254
See id. at 135.
251
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they can get away with it, or for any number of other reasons. If
confronted, then they have an incentive to cover up their mistakes to avoid
the harmful consequences. 255 This will make it even more difficult for a
defendant to prove either his innocence or the prosecutor’s wrongdoing
postconviction. 256
Granting absolute immunity for prosecutors should not be mistaken as
granting prosecutors permission to engage in a free-for-all. Absolute
immunity will undoubtedly protect some miscreant prosecutors who will
trample defendants’ constitutional rights with impunity. But the current
mixture of qualified and absolute immunity has not solved this problem
either. It has led to a law that encourages defendants who have genuinely
suffered wrongs into endless litigation with elements that are nearly
impossible to prove. A clearly articulated absolute immunity rule would at
least prevent this more insidious form of unfairness against criminal
defendants. Additionally, absolute immunity for prosecutors does not alter
the current ethical and criminal sanctions for prosecutorial misconduct. It
may even increase enforcement of those ethical and criminal sanctions since
when money damages are removed from the equation, those sanctions will
among the few avenues left to defendants seeking to right the wrongs done
to them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The most common sense and expedient way of dealing with the
pervasive issue of prosecutorial misconduct is for the Supreme Court to
articulate a rule that grants prosecutors absolute immunity in all cases. The
functional test initially proposed in Imbler has proven difficult to apply and
is practically unworkable as currently formulated. The combination of
Imbler’s progeny and the municipal liability cases has forced litigants to
frame the issue of prosecutorial misconduct in a highly specific and
artificial way.
Criminal defendants claiming a violation of their
constitutional rights must allege that the district attorney was deliberately
indifferent to the need to train his subordinates. Only showing a pattern of
constitutional violations by prosecutors can prove this. Yet there is no clear
standard in the case law for how to prove a pattern. The Connick opinion
even seems to prevent defendants from ever proving a pattern, because all
prosecutors have passed the bar and attended law school, so their district
attorney will always be justified in believing that they know how to avoid
255

Zacharias and Green have noted the incentive that strict ethical sanctions create to
cover up misconduct, but it has not been considered in the context of qualified immunity.
See Zacharias & Green, supra note 209, at 41–42.
256
See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 n.25 (1976).
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constitutional violations.
In certain exceptional cases, a defendant may be allowed to show that
a prosecutor’s behavior was so obviously in violation of the Constitution
that a single violation amounts to deliberate indifference. The Court has
never found a municipality liable on the basis of a single incident, despite
the availability of this alternative method of proof since the Harris decision
in 1989. The majority in Connick rejected Thompson’s case under this
standard.
Ginsburg’s dissent complicated the matter by claiming
Thompson had proved single-incident liability, but then articulating all of
the incidents that may have proven a pattern of constitutional violations in
Thompson’s case.
Connick has left the state of prosecutorial liability hopelessly
confused—not that it was a shining example of clarity prior to Connick. In
addition to the weak functional test, the Court’s analysis of the common law
foundations of prosecutorial absolute immunity reads like fiction. Even if
there was common law precedent for an absolute immunity rule,
prosecution has changed so drastically since early American common law
that the justifications for the rule are moot today.
Most of the commentators following these trends in the Court are
convinced that more oversight is the answer to the problem of prosecutorial
misconduct. The suggestions put forth regarding ethical reform and internal
restructuring of prosecutors’ offices are completely out of touch with
reality. Prosecutors’ offices lack both the resources and the institutional
will to implement even some of the simplest reforms proposed.
Additionally, prosecutors as a group have proven remarkably resilient to
efforts to alter—even slightly—how they do their jobs. The culture of
prosecutors’ offices has much to do with this mindset, but it is reinforced by
the reluctance of other attorneys, judges, legislatures, and voters to interfere
with the work of those who keep criminals in prison.
Absolute immunity for prosecutors already exists in practice, now the
Court needs to make it official and overrule the Imbler line of cases to the
extent that they articulate a mixed qualified and absolute regime. The
violation of criminal defendants’ constitutional rights by the people who
prosecute them is grossly unfair. But it is even more grossly unfair that
those defendants who successfully overcome a wrongful conviction on the
basis of prosecutorial misconduct are led to believe that the law will
provide them some recompense under § 1983. It almost never has, and
after Connick, the chances that it ever will have decreased dramatically.
An absolute immunity rule will almost certainly allow some
prosecutors to get away with malicious, egregious, and flagrantly
unconstitutional behavior. But the reality is that American society is
unwilling to pay the costs that would be associated with having only
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qualified immunity for prosecutors. Part of this mindset is the very
legitimate concern that the award of damages under a qualified immunity
regime detracts from other valuable societal objectives. But another part of
this attitude is the general lack of empathy that Americans have for criminal
defendants, even those who have eventually been proven innocent. Justice
Thomas’s opinion in Connick exemplifies this—his reasoning is dismissive,
and at points almost facile, in spite of the fact that he was deciding a case in
which an innocent man had spent twenty-six years of his life fighting the
system that should have protected him. Changes in this attitude must come
from the citizens themselves, because they will not come from changing the
rules governing prosecutors. Somebody will have to help them understand
that, but that is the subject of another work.
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